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I. INTRODUCTION

The application of the First Amendment to public universities1
has long been a source of confusion and frustration for both
universities and courts. In particular, application of the First
Amendment to student publications such as newspapers, magazines,
and yearbooks has led to a great deal of litigation and controversy.
The protection afforded by the First Amendment to these publications
at the university level is extremely unclear and the circuit courts'
inconsistent treatment of the college press has further confused the
issue.
How should the First Amendment apply to public universities?
An instinctive response is that a college student should enjoy the
same, if not greater, protections than the average citizen. After all,
"[t]he very mission of a college or university depends upon broad
latitude for viewpoints in the pursuit of truth and understanding. So
of all places in society where people may express controversial views,
should not the university campus be the most open and speech the

1.
This Note will not address the free speech rights of students at private colleges and
universities, as they are outside the scope of the constitutional discussion contained herein.
Private schools, because they are not state actors, have much greater authority to censor the
content of their school publications. Such censorship does not run afoul of the First Amendment,
and, for this reason, discussing private schools in this Note would only further confuse an
already complicated area of law. However, it is important to note that some private universities
are subject to the First Amendment. For example, private universities in California have been
subjected to the First Amendment by statute. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 2006). Private
universities that are subjected to the First Amendment, such as Stanford University, would be
treated the same as a state university should a student allege a violation of his or her First
Amendment rights.
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freest?" 2 In general, courts have also recognized the importance of
First Amendment protections for public school students. For instance,
the Supreme Court has held that "[i]t can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
3
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
On the contrary, the schoolhouse gate has historically served
as a barrier between American students and full protection under the
First Amendment, as the First Amendment rights of minor students
in public schools "are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults."4 Courts have recognized a limitation on students' First
Amendment rights "in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment." 5 Much of this has to do with the age of the students, for
in many situations minors are not entitled to the same legal rights as
those recognized as legal adults. 6 Even speech on college campuses,
however, has been more closely regulated than speech in the
community at large because "the values inherent in certain campus
communities impose on speech a higher standard than does society at
7
large."
Students at public colleges and universities thus occupy a
confusing middle ground in terms of First Amendment application.
These students are usually legal adults, yet they remain in an
educational environment. Just as college serves as a developmental
stepping-stone between childhood and adulthood, the legal status of
college students is often one of finding middle ground between the
rights of children and the rights of adults who are no longer enrolled
in school. For this reason, the status of these students under the First
Amendment warrants special analysis to determine whether courts
should classify students at public colleges and universities as children,
as adults, or as holding an intermediate status.
The extent to which freedom of the press is protected on college
campuses is a difficult issue to analyze because of the variety of forms
that speech may take in the college community. It is critical to note
the distinction between student speech connected to a university
simply because the speech is uttered there and speech connected to a
classroom environment or to a university-supported extracurricular
activity. For example, there is a great difference between a speech
2.

ROBERT O'NEIL, FREE SPEECH IN THE COLLEGE COMMUNITY vii (1997).

3.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
4.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 US 675, 682 (1986).
5. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
6.
Gregory C. Lisby, Resolving the Hazelwood Conundrum: The FirstAmendment Rights of
College Students in Kincaid v. Gibson and Beyond, 7 COMM. LAW & POL'Y 129, 130-31 (2002).
7.

O'NEIL, supra note 2, at ix.
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given by a student in the middle of the campus and an editorial
written by a student and printed in a university-supported student
publication. Courts classify the former as political speech
unconditionally protected by the First Amendment, but the latter's
status is much less clear. Thus, when courts consider studentproduced publications at the university level, they consistently hold
that "independent" or "underground" campus media-media that is
produced by students and distributed on campus but otherwise has no
affiliation with the university-must be free from regulation by a
university. 8 On the other hand, courts are divided as to what control a
university may exercise over a student publication to which it provides
financial support in some way.
The Supreme Court has decided one particularly significant
case involving a student publication at a public high school. 9 In
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court held that an
educator may exercise editorial control over a school-sponsored
student publication so long as the educator's actions are "reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 10 In a footnote, the Court
declined to decide whether its holding also applied to colleges and
universities." Hazelwood became the governing standard for high
school publications, while the legal status of collegiate publications
remained unclear.
Until recently, no court had extended Hazelwood to a studentcontrolled publication at a public college or university. That changed
on June 20, 2005, when the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit issued its holding in Hosty v. Carter,a case involving
an administrator's prior review of a student-produced newspaper at
Governors State University in University Park, Illinois. 12 In reaching
its decision that the university's actions were constitutional, the court
found that "there is no sharp difference between high school and
college papers" and therefore that Hazelwood's framework applied at
the university level as well. 13 The plaintiffs in Hosty appealed their

8.
See Solid Rock Found. v. Ohio State Univ., 478 F. Supp. 96, 101 (S.D. Ohio 1979)
(stating that Ohio State University's ability to regulate distribution of an underground campus
paper is limited to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions); Channing Club v. Bd. of
Regents, 317 F. Supp. 688, 692 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (holding that Texas Tech University violated the
First Amendment by prohibiting the distribution of an independent satire publication on
campus).
9.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).
10. Id. at 273.
11. Id. at 273 n.7.
12. Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 412 F.3d 731, 732-33 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
13. Id. at 735-36.
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case to the Supreme Court, and the Court declined to review the case
on February 21, 2006.14
The Hosty holding creates additional confusion regarding
Hazelwood's applicability in the college setting. Although the court
purported to apply the Hazelwood framework to the facts of Hosty, it
later acknowledged that many college newspapers are limited-purpose
public fora in which administrators may not interfere. 15 In doing so, it
echoed the sentiments of an earlier Sixth Circuit case, Kincaid v.
Gibson,' 6 which flatly rejected the application of Hazelwood at the
college level. The Hosty holding is thus a paradoxical one that creates
further confusion regarding Hazelwood's applicability in the college
setting. 17
The crux of the Hosty controversy is the First Amendment
status of students at public colleges and universities and, in
particular, the status of the publications they produce. Hosty has once
again raised the question of how much authority a university should
have over its student-produced publications. On one hand, Hosty erred
by stating that there was no sharp difference between high school and
college publications under the First Amendment. In fact, college and
high school newspapers are very different, as are the college and high
school environments. On the other hand, Hosty was correct in holding
that universities do have some interest in their student-produced
publications. Therefore, the court might have correctly applied one
element of Hazelwood's holding to college campuses. For this reason,
the application of Hazelwood to colleges and universities, if done
properly, will not be as catastrophic as free press advocates fear.
Part II of this Note explores the history of freedom of the press
at both the college and high school levels and, in particular, the
impact of Hazelwood and Hosty on this freedom. Part III of this Note
outlines three possible standards of review to apply when evaluating
the legal status of student newspapers at colleges and universities: (1)
the Hosty/Hazelwood standard, (2) the "intermediate scrutiny"
standard, and (3) the standard applied to professional journalists.
Part IV of this Note explains why all three standards are
inappropriate in this situation, highlighting the danger of upholding
14. Hosty v. Carter, 126 S. Ct. 1330 (2006).
15. Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 735, 737.
16. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001).
17. See Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 737 (stating that a school may declare a student newspaper
open for expression as a designated public forum and therefore disable itself from engaging in
viewpoint or content discrimination); Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 346 n.5, 348-49 (holding that a
university creates a designated public forum when it opens a forum for use by the public for the
discussion of certain subjects, that the student yearbook in this case was a designated public
forum, and therefore Hazelwood had little application).
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the Seventh Circuit's holding in Hosty. Finally, Part V of this Note
articulates and analyzes a new test that at once incorporates elements
of precedent, recognizes a university's interest in the publications it
supports, and grants broad First Amendment protection to college
journalists.
II. A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS ON COLLEGE AND HIGH
SCHOOL CAMPUSES

Over the past forty years, the federal courts have conducted an
extensive analysis of the First Amendment's application to schools and
colleges. This Part will provide an overview of that history, focusing on
the courts' treatment of college students and their free press rights. In
particular, how Hosty and Hazelwood have altered the legal landscape
regarding student speech rights will be examined closely.
A. The Pre-Hazelwood Trend of Broad FirstAmendment Protection
Students gained substantial First Amendment protection after
the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, which established a test that
would protect students' free speech rights so long as their speech did
not constitute a material and substantial disruption of the educational
environment.1 8 Tinker involved three students, two in high school and
one in middle school, who wore black armbands to school to protest
the Vietnam War. 19 The principals of the Des Moines public schools
had established a rule that any student wearing an armband to school
would be asked to remove it, and if a student refused, the school would
suspend the student until the student returned to school without the
21
armband. 20 The plaintiffs were all suspended pursuant to this policy.
Holding that the school district's policy was a violation of the
students' First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court stated that
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression" and that "this sort of
hazardous freedom ... is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans." 22 The Court held that the
school district's actions could not be justified by a mere desire to avoid
controversy. A policy restricting students' freedom of expression was
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
Id. at 504.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 508-09.
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only permissible when such expression would materially and
23
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.
Although Tinker has never been expressly overruled, the
"material and substantial disruption" test suffered a major legal blow
in 1986 when the Supreme Court decided Bethel School District No.
403 v. Fraser.24 The Court in Bethel distinguished Tinker on the basis
that Tinker involved passive political speech while the present case
involved more disruptive speech, 25 holding that "[t]he First
Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining
that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent's would
undermine the school's basic educational mission." 26
Perhaps the most important pre-Hazelwood case expressly
establishing the First Amendment rights of college students is Healy
v. James, in which the Central Connecticut State College chapter of
Students for a Democratic Society challenged the college
administration's rejection of its application to obtain recognition as a
campus organization. 27 Holding that the administration's actions
violated the students' First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he mere disagreement of the President with the group's
philosophy affords no reason to deny it recognition." 28 Although the
Court recognized the need for educators to have authority over their
students, it noted that "the precedents of this Court leave no room for
the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First
Amendment protections should apply with less force on college
campuses than in the community at large." 29 Therefore, Healy
suggested that college students enjoy the same freedom of speech as
adults not enrolled in school, while at the same time hinting at the
fact that the university has an interest over the student organizations
it sponsors.
Numerous lower courts have rendered decisions granting
expansive First Amendment rights to student publications at colleges
and universities. In Trujillo v. Love, for instance, a Southern Colorado
State College student successfully challenged her suspension by the
college as managing editor of the student newspaper after she wrote

23. Id. at 509, 514.
24. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
25. Id. at 680. This case involved a student election campaign speech delivered by a student
at a high school assembly which contained "an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor."
Id. at 677-78.
26. Id. at 685.
27. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 172 (1972).
28. Id. at 187.
29. Id. at 180.
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articles critical of the administration. 30 The court held that "[hiaving
established a particular forum for expression, officials may not then
place limitations upon the use of that forum which interfere with
protected speech and are not unjustified by an overriding state
interest." 3 1 In reaching its decision, the court applied Tinker's
"material and substantial interference" test and found that the college
could not justify its actions under this standard. 32 In Arrington v.
Taylor, the Middle District of North Carolina held that for First
Amendment purposes, a campus newspaper is part of the "press," and
the state may not restrict expression because of the paper's message,
ideas, contents, or subject matter.3 3 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit held
that Florida Atlantic University violated three students' First
Amendment rights when the university's president fired them from
the school newspaper after he became dissatisfied with the quality of
the paper. 34 In Stanley v. Magrath, the Eighth Circuit found that the
University of Minnesota violated the First Amendment when it
reduced funding to the campus newspaper after the paper published a
particularly controversial "Humor Issue."35 In so holding, the court
reaffirmed the then-universally acknowledged principle that a public
university violates the First Amendment when it takes adverse action
against a student publication because it disapproves of the
36
publication's content.
Cases such as Healy and Tinker, therefore, led to a series of
victories in the federal courts for college student publications. 37
However, the most significant case dealing with First Amendment
protections to student publications involved a high school, not a
college, publication, and it reduced, rather than expanded, students'
rights.

30. Trujillo v. Love, 322 F.Supp. 1266, 1267-69, 1271 (D. Colo. 1971).
31. Id. at 1270.
32. Id.
33. Arrington v. Taylor, 380 F. Supp. 1348, 1365 (M.D. N.C. 1974).
34. Schiffv. Williams, 519 F.2d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 1975).
35. Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279, 280 (8th Cir. 1983).
36. Id. at 282.
37. See, e.g., Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) (citing Healy for the
proposition that "a college... "may not restrict speech ... simply because it finds the views
expressed by any group to be abhorrent.' "); Trujillo, 322 F. Supp. at 1270 (finding that "[iun the
context of an educational institution, a prohibition on protected speech, to be valid, must be
necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline.");
Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (D. Mass 1970) (applying the Tinker "material
and substantial disruption" test to a college newspaper and finding that the school was not
justified in taking action).
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B. Hazelwood and Its Potential Extension to College Campuses
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of administrators'
authority to control the content of student publications in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, finding that a high school principal was
justified in deleting two pages of articles in a student newspaper that
discussed divorce and teen pregnancy. 38 The principal felt that the
articles violated students' privacy and contained material
inappropriate for the school's younger students. 39 In reaching its
conclusion, the Hazelwood opinion declined to apply the Tinker
standard to student publications, stating that high schools may
regulate student speech in a different manner when the school
attaches its name and resources to the dissemination of the speech. 40
Instead, the Court formulated a two-prong forum analysis test to
determine whether a secondary school may control the content of a
student publication.
Forum analysis is a central component of First Amendment
litigation. The extent to which a government may regulate speech is
limited by the speech's setting. There are three possible fora: a public
forum, a nonpublic forum, and a designated public forum. A public
forum is defined as a place "which by long tradition or by government
fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,"4 1 such as a park or a
sidewalk. In a public forum, the government's ability to suppress
speech is "sharply circumscribed." 42 On the other hand, speech in a
nonpublic forum is subject to all reasonable regulations imposed by
the government. 43 A designated public forum, also referred to as a
limited-purpose public forum, is a forum created by the government
that is deemed by the government to be a place open to various forms
44
of expression.
The Hazelwood Court concluded that high school newspapers
were not public fora because of their place in the school's curriculum. 45
Consequently, the court addressed the question that would become the
second prong of the Hazelwood test: the circumstances under which a
school may regulate speech in a nonpublic forum. According to the
Court, the rationales for its decision in Hazelwood revolved around the
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
Id. at 263.
Id. at 272-73.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
Id.

43.

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.

44.

Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

45.

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 269.
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age of the students and a school's duty to play the role of a "principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment." 46 Thus, the Court held that "[e]ducators
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
47
pedagogical concerns."
Critics of the Hazelwood decision decried it as overly sweeping,
and the Student Press Law Center argued that the case "didn't merely
adjust the First Amendment balance between administrative
authority and student free speech rights, it pretty much tossed out the
scale." 48 There was a silver lining, however, in a footnote to the
majority opinion in which the Court stated that it "need not decide
whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to
school- sponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level."

49

In the years following Hazelwood, there was great concern that
its holding would be applied to colleges and universities. 50 The
Student Press Law Center, on the other hand, remained confident
that such an event was unlikely to take place, stating in its legal guide
to student journalists:
If some day a college or university journalism department does go to court to argue that
the Hazelwood decision should be extended to the college press, it will find itself in a
politically awkward position. For a court to do what the school requests, it would have to
ignore or overrule over 20 years of established First Amendment decisions that
emphasize the importance of freedom of the press. One can imagine that few schools
concerned with the respect of their academic and professional peers and their ability to
in a quality journalism education will be inclined to take
attract students interested
51
such a precipitous step.

46. Id. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
47. Id. at 261. Listed by the Court as activities related to legitimate pedagogical concerns
were ensuring that students in a journalism program learn lessons appropriate to the activity,
maintaining a high standard of quality in student publications, preventing sensitive subject
matter from reaching a young audience, prohibiting the advocacy of illegal or inappropriate
conduct, preventing the association of the school with non-neutral positions on matters of
political controversy, and protecting the privacy of students and their families. Id. at 271-72,
274-75. Although not all of these activities and concerns are "pedagogical" in that they do not all
relate to the traditional teaching and learning process, they are nonetheless classified as such by
the Court.
48. Mike Hiestand, The Hosty v. Carter Decision: What It Means, TRENDS IN COLLEGE
MEDIA, July 6, 2005, http://www.studentpress.org/acp/trends/lawO7O5college.html.
49. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7.
50. O'NEIL, supra note 2, at 129.
51.

STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR., LAW OF THE STUDENT PRESS 56 (2d ed. 1994).
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Interestingly, while Hazelwood declined to decide whether its
First Amendment analysis applied to college students, the opinion
took great pains to emphasize that the age and maturity of the
students were major factors in the decision, 52 thereby implying that
the issue of college students' rights would require a different analysis.
This viewpoint is consistent with courts' long-standing "fundamental
assumption" that college students are less impressionable than
students in primary and secondary school and thus require different
53
levels of First Amendment protection.
The holding in Hazelwood, while sweeping with regard to high
school students, left a legal hole surrounding the college press. Thus,
while Hazelwood was viewed as a major blow to freedom of the press
in public high schools, college students were, for the time being,
spared the same fate.
C. College PublicationsPost-Hazelwood
In the years since the Supreme Court decided Hazelwood, the
lower federal courts have differed in their treatment of college
publications and other free speech issues associated with public
colleges and universities. The First Circuit was the first to address
Hazelwood's applicability at the college level, holding that Hazelwood
was inapplicable to college newspapers. 54 In Kincaid v. Gibson, a 2001
case involving Kentucky State University's student yearbook, the
Sixth Circuit stated that "Hazelwood has little application to this
case." 55 The court found that the yearbook was a limited-purpose
public forum, not a nonpublic forum. 56 In a limited-purpose public
forum, the government opens the forum for use by the public for
assembly and speech. 57 Kincaid held that in a limited-purpose public
forum, such as the student yearbook at the center of the case, the
government: (1) may impose only reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations; (2) may not impose viewpoint regulations; and (3) may
impose content regulations that are narrowly drawn to effectuate a

52.

Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272.

53. Deanna N. Pihos, Note, Assuming Maturity Matters: The Limited Reach of the
Establishment Clause at Public Universities, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1349, 1363 (2005) (discussing
how a fundamental assumption that college students are more mature and less impressionable
than high school students drives courts' scrutiny of school prayer at these institutions).
54. Student Gov't Ass'n v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir.
1989).

55.
56.

Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 346 n.5.

57.

Id. at 348.

1782

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:5:1771

to extend its
compelling state interest. 58 The court in Kincaid declined
59
level.
college
the
at
newspapers
standard to student
Other circuits have issued more confusing opinions. Both the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have applied Hazelwood to college
campuses, but both circuits dealt solely with student speech within
the classroom, rather than speech contained in an extracurricular
publication. 60 For example, the Tenth Circuit applied Hazelwood
because "[n]owhere is [Hazelwood's reasoning] more true than in the
context of a school's right to determine what to teach and how to teach
it in its classrooms." 61 The Eleventh Circuit similarly focused on inclass activities and the authority of educators to control their
curricula. 62 Consequently, while these courts held Hazelwood
applicable to the university setting, they left the door open to apply a
different framework when the speech at issue occurs outside of the
classroom.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit applied Hazelwood to a public
university in its majority opinion in Brown v. Li.63 In Brown, the
plaintiff was a student at a public university, the University of
California at Santa Barbara, and was challenging the university's
refusal to file the student's thesis in the university library. 64 The
reason for the university's disapproval was a "Disacknowledgements"
section in the student's graduate thesis which included profanity
directed at various persons, including the dean of the student's
graduate program and the former governor of California. 65 The court
applied Hazelwood as the standard for reviewing a university's
assessment of a student's academic work. 66 However, the precedential
force of Brown is somewhat confusing and ambiguous, as the members
of the appellate panel set forth three "distinct and incompatible
68
views" 67 of Hazelwood's applicability in the collegiate setting.
58. Id. at 354.
59. Id. at 348 n.6.
60. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that
Hazelwood supplies the framework when determining the degree of First Amendment protection
granted to a student's speech in a classroom exercise); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071
(11th Cir. 1991) (using Hazelwood's definition of a public forum to determine that a professor's
in-class speech was subject to reasonable regulation by university administrators).
61. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1284.
62. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074.
63. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).
64. Id. at 943.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 949.
67. The three-judge panel that decided Brown consisted of Judges Warren J. Ferguson,
Stephen Reinhardt, and Susan P. Graber. Id. at 940. Judge Graber wrote the opinion of the court
and applied Hazelwood to decide the case. Id. at 941, 949. Judge Ferguson agreed that the
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D. The Application of Hazelwood to College Newspapers: Hosty v.
Carter
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit decided Hosty v. Carter, a case that revisited the issue of
whether a public university's administrators could control the content
of a student-run newspaper. As the first decision to apply Hazelwood
to college newspapers, Hosty is a landmark First Amendment case.
The three plaintiffs in Hosty were appointed by the Governors
State University's Student Communications Media Board to serve as
editor-in-chief, managing editor, and staff reporter for the Innovator,
the university's newspaper, which was supported by student fees. 69
During her tenure at the Innovator, plaintiff Hosty authored several
articles critical of the university's administration; in particular, she
wrote articles attacking the integrity of Roger K. Oden, the Dean of
the College of Arts and Science at Governors State. 70 The newspaper
later refused to retract statements that the administration deemed
false. 71 Tension between the Innovator's staff and university
administration rose, and Dean of Student Affairs and Services
Patricia Carter told the Innovator's printer not to print any issues of
the paper without her review and approval. 72 The newspaper refused
to submit to prior review, and publication of the newspaper ceased in
73
November 2000.
The plaintiffs sued the University, its trustees, and several
administrators and staff members for damages, alleging a violation of
their First Amendment rights, and the district court granted summary
judgment to all defendants except Dean Carter. 74 In a panel decision,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding, stating that "Dean Carter's contention that she could
not reasonably have known that it was illegal to order the Innovator's
printer to halt further publication of the newspaper or to require prior

plaintiffs First Amendment rights were not violated and concurred in the judgment, but did not
apply Hazelwood and instead said that the plaintiffs speech constituted deception. Id. at 955-56.
Judge Reinhardt concurred in part and dissented in part, stating that Hazelwood had no
application at the college level. Id. at 956-57.
68. Hosty v. Carter (Hosty 11), 412 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
69. Hosty v. Carter (Hosty 1), 325 F.3d 945, 946 (7th Cir. 2003); Hosty I1 412 F.3d at 73233. Because the two Seventh Circuit opinions in Hosty were selective in their presentation of the
facts, both opinions are cited to present all of the relevant facts.
70. Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 731, 732-33.
71. Id. at 733.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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approval of the newspaper's content defies existing, well-established
law."

75

In 2005, the Seventh Circuit reheard the case en banc and
reversed its earlier decision.7 6 Writing for the majority, Judge
Easterbrook stated that "there is no sharp difference between high
school and college papers" and proceeded to apply the Hazelwood
standard to this case, setting the precedent that Hazelwood would
apply to subsidized student newspapers at public colleges. 77 The court
held that Dean Carter was entitled to qualified immunity because the
law regarding college publications was sufficiently unclear such that a
reasonable person in her position could not be expected to know how
to handle the situation.7 8 Because the Seventh Circuit decided Hosty
on qualified immunity grounds, 79 Judge Easterbrook did not finish his
Hazelwood analysis. He did, however, make clear that he intended to
set a precedent of applying Hazelwood at the university level.8 0 The
three plaintiffs appealed their case to the Supreme Court on
September 16, 2005, and the Court declined to review the decision on
February 21, 2006.81
Response to the Hosty decision was immediate and
impassioned, as critics feared that "[students'] rights ha[d] taken a
permanent vacation."8 2 Although courts have applied Hazelwood's
reasoning to First Amendment issues at public universities in the
past,8 3 Hosty was the first case to apply the Hazelwood framework to a
student newspaper at the university level. It was also the first case to
apply Hazelwood to student expression outside the classroom. In doing
so, Hosty marked a departure from a substantial body of pre- and postHazelwood law that prevented university administrators from
84
requiring prior review of student media.
Hosty also prompted concrete responses from its critics. For
example, the Student Press Law Center has urged colleges and
universities in the Seventh Circuit to grant public forum status
75. Hosty I, 325 F.3d 945, 948 (7th Cir. 2003).
76. Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 732, 739.
77. Id. at 735.
78. Id. at 738.
79. Id. at 738-39. Qualified immunity protects government officials performing
discretionary functions from liability when their conduct does not clearly violate established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have been aware. Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
80 Id. at 735.
81. Hosty v. Carter, 126 S. Ct. 1330 (2006).
82. Greg Lukianoff, Wronging Student Rights, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3, 2005, at A17.
83. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
84. Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 742-43 (Evans, J., dissenting).
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(thereby making the forum a designated public forum) to their
student-run publications.8 5 Additionally, on February 24, 2006,
California State Assembly members Leland Yee and Joe Nation
introduced A.B. 2581, a bill which sought to prohibit state university
officials from placing prior restraints on student publications.8 6 Under
the proposed law, college journalists would have the same free speech
rights as professional journalists.8 7 Universities would, however,
retain the authority to discipline students for publishing hate speech,
and college newspapers would remain subject to libel and slander
laws.8 8 California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed A.B. 2581
into law on August 28, 2006.89 The California statute, the first to
extend First Amendment protections to college journalists, will take
effect on January 1, 2007.90
Despite the backlash, Hosty may not be as severe a blow to
students' First Amendment rights as critics may think. Hosty was
ultimately decided on qualified immunity grounds, not under the
Hazelwood test. 91 In fact, the court in Hosty noted that "the Board
established the Innovator in a designated public forum, where the
editors were empowered to make their own decisions, wise or foolish,
92
without fear that the administration would stop the presses."
Therefore it seems possible, even likely, that had qualified immunity
not been at issue, the court would have found that the newspaper
should have been free from interference from the university's
administration. For this reason, Hosty is unlikely to "spark a torrent
of censorship on university campuses," as so many critics of the
93
holding fear.
Hosty remains significant, however, for applying Hazelwood to
universities. By so doing, Hosty opened the door to censorship of
student publications. Hosty's internal inconsistency regarding college
newspapers makes its legacy unclear. At one point, the court states
that there is "no sharp difference" between high school and college
85. Student Press Law Center, The Public Forum List, http://www.splc.org/legalresearch
.asp?id=91 (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
86. A.B. 2581, 2005-06 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006).
87. Id.
88. The Associated Press, Calif. Senate Votes to Protect Rights of College Journalists,FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER, Aug. 11, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=17267.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
92. Id. at 738.
93. Douglas Lee, Hosty Ruling on College Press Leaves Heads Scratching, FIRST
AMENDMENT

CENTER,

aspx?id=15495.

June

29,

2005,

http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.
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newspapers, suggesting that university administrators have the same
power to restrict a publication's content as their high school
counterparts. 94 Later in the opinion, however, the court states that a
university newspaper, unlike a high school newspaper, could serve as
a designated public forum with which university administrators may
95
not interfere.
Perhaps Hosty's greatest significance is that it further muddies
the landscape of college students' free speech rights. The Supreme
Court's refusal to decide whether Hazelwood should apply at the
collegiate level has led to a great deal of confusion, and Hosty
compounds that confusion by applying Hazelwood in a new setting.
The court's statement that there is "no sharp difference" between high
school and college newspapers opens the door to a blurring of the line
between high school and college rights, potentially leading to an
erosion of collegiate free speech rights across the board. This
statement by Hosty also implies that universities would have the same
"legitimate pedagogical concerns" as high schools.
Hosty is also confusing because of its unclear forum analysis.
The court's statements regarding limited-purpose public fora were not
as prominently featured in the case as in the Hazelwood analysis, and
it is unclear whether courts applying Hosty would apply its discussion
of limited-purpose public fora. In fact, Hosty merely held that college
newspapers may be limited-purpose public fora, not that they always
are. 96 Hosty explicitly declined to extend Kincaid to college
newspapers on the grounds that Kincaid was decided after Dean
Carter had imposed restrictions on the Innovator.97 Given that Hosty
explicitly extends Hazelwood to college newspapers, and Kincaid
explicitly rejects the application of Hazelwood to college campuses, it
would seem impossible for Hosty to uphold both Hazelwood and
Kincaid in their entirety. Therefore, the most logical interpretation of
the messy Hosty holding is that the Hazelwood test governs and that
the Kincaid-like analysis mentioned in Hosty's dicta does not. That
being said, another court could interpret this language differently and
state that under Hosty's "college Hazelwood' test, a college newspaper
that is a limited-purpose public forum may not be subject to prior
review. Because Hosty has left such confusing precedent, it is critical
that the Supreme Court formulate a clear standard of review that will

94.
95.
96.
97.

Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 735.
Id. at 738.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 738-39.
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ameliorate the legal ambiguities that have surrounded the college
press since Hazelwood.
III. POSSIBLE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Courts' holdings in cases such as Hosty, Hazelwood, and Brown
have bred great confusion as to the status of the student press at
public colleges and universities. For this reason, courts have
considered various standards of review to determine the free speech
rights of college students participating in an extracurricular student
publication. This Part will explore three possible standards.9 8 The first
is the Seventh Circuit's holding in Hosty. In particular, the first
standard seizes on Hosty's holding that there is "no sharp difference"
between high school and college newspapers. The second is an
"intermediate scrutiny" standard used in a variety of cases involving
public universities. The third is the standard applied to professional
journalists in the community at large.
A. Hosty, Hazelwood, Reasonableness, and Legitimate Pedagogical
Concerns
Under Hosty's assertion that there is "no sharp difference"
between high school and college newspapers and that Hazelwood
applies to colleges, the test for whether a university administrator can
place a prior restraint on the content of a student publication would be
a collegiate version of the Hazelwood forum analysis test.99 Under this
potential Hosty test, 100 the first question for courts would be whether
the journalist in question is a speaker in a public forum. 10 1 If so, then
102
the First Amendment would prohibit censorship of the publication.
However, a newspaper or other similar publication's status as an
extracurricular activity, as opposed to a part of the curriculum, would
not suffice to establish status as a public forum. 103 If instead a court

98. In addition, a fourth standard that has been considered by scholars is a revival of
Tinker at the university level. Karyl Roberts Martin, Note, Demoted to High School: Are College
Students' Free Speech Rights the Same as Those of High School Students?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 173,
199-200 (2003). Because Tinker has experienced substantial judicial erosion over the years and
because it was decided with regard to high schools, not colleges, I have opted not to analyze this
standard.
99. Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 735.
100. As stated above, Hosty's unclear language could lead to multiple interpretations of the
case's actual holding. See supra Part II.D.
101. Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 735.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 736.
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were to find that the publication is a non-public forum, then the
university could supervise its content.104 The only limit on the
university's control in that situation would be the requirement that its
actions must be reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns. 10 5 In analyzing whether a university's control over a student
publication is appropriate, a court applying this test would apply the
same "legitimate pedagogical concerns" as it would when analyzing
the actions of a high school,106 the one possible exception being a
10 7
consideration of the maturity of the student body.
The Hosty court reasoned that a college newspaper could serve
as a limited-purpose public forum and thus be subject to greater First
Amendment protection under the Kincaid standard, rather than the
more restrictive Hazelwood standard. 0 8 For reasons discussed supra,
analysis of a potential Hosty test under the "no sharp difference"
reasoning should not presume that Hosty would allow a student
newspaper at the college level to be classified as a limited-purpose
public forum. Until another court decides to the contrary, Kincaid will
continue to be inapplicable to newspapers at the college level.
Furthermore, Hosty explicitly holds that Hazelwood is the governing
test, a test that Kincaid explicitly rejects.
Thus, Hosty held that based on the facts available, the
Innovator likely was a limited-purpose public forum and as a result
could not be censored by University administration.109 As such, Hosty
on its face appears not to place many restrictions on college
newspapers. However, it does not definitively hold that a college
newspaper is a limited-purpose public forum, just that it may be
one. 110 Furthermore, even if future interpretations of Hosty treat
college newspapers as limited public fora, its "no sharp difference"
language remains, allowing for a blurring of the line between high
school and college free speech rights both inside and outside of the
classroom.
In sum, the Hosty standard is a complete extension of
Hazelwood at the university level. Under such a standard, a
104. Id.
105. Id. at 737.
106 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
107. Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 734-35.
108. See id. at 737 ("But by establishing a subsidized student newspaper the University may
have created a venue that goes by the name... 'limited purpose public forum.' ").
109. Id. at 738. This finding by the court makes its ultimate holding confusing as the court
ultimately decided in favor of the University. However, it is important to note that the
University won on qualified immunity grounds, not directly on the merits of its case that it had
the right to control the content of the newspaper. Id. at 738-39.
110. Id. at 737.
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university may control the content of its student newspaper as long as
the newspaper is not a public forum and there is a reasonable
educational purpose for the university's actions.1 11 Since Hazelwood
holds that "[e]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns," a
direct application of Hazelwood will allow university administrators to
wield broad power over any school-sponsored publication that is not
intentionally opened as a forum for public discourse. 112 A court
applying Hosty would allow universities to assert the same set of
"legitimate pedagogical concerns" as high schools, as Hosty implicitly
held that universities had the same pedagogical concerns as high
schools, the one possible exception being a consideration of students'
maturity.
B. Brown and Intermediate Scrutiny
The intermediate scrutiny test provides a compromise between
limiting college journalists to Hosty rights and granting them the
expansive rights of professional journalists. Intermediate scrutiny has
not been used by a court with regard to an extracurricular collegiate
publication, but the dissenting opinion in Brown v. Li advocated this
approach as a possible alternative when determining the First
Amendment rights of college students. 113 In another case, United
States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court applied this standard to a
14
university in the context of gender discrimination.1
Under intermediate scrutiny as applied to the First
Amendment, a university seeking to control the content of a student
publication must demonstrate that its regulation was substantially
related to an important state interest and that the regulation serves
such an interest. 115 Under this approach, the justification offered by
the government-in this case the university-must be genuine, not
hypothesized, and it cannot be an invented post hoc response to
litigation. 116 For instance, Virginia held that the Virginia Military
Institute's males-only admission policy violated the Fourteenth
111. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
112. Id.
113. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 964 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
114. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
115. Brown, 308 F.3d at 964.
116. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
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Amendment because the university showed "no 'exceedingly
117
persuasive justification'" for its policy.
This standard of review would be more protective of students'
rights than the "reasonableness" standard introduced in Hazelwood
and followed in Hosty.118 On the other hand, intermediate scrutiny
allows a university to maintain some control over its student
publications. This approach is similar to Kincaid in that it requires a
compelling governmental interest; however, it affords more deference
to educators' content-based decisions than does the strict scrutiny
standard that applies under a limited-purpose public forum
analysis. 119
C. New York Times and Expansive Rights
Finally, a third approach would be to return to courts' preHazelwood treatment of student publications at colleges and
universities and grant them full First Amendment protection, using
the standard applied to professional journalists as a guide. 120 Under
this approach, student newspapers at public colleges and universities
would enjoy the full range of First Amendment protections granted to
professional journalists in the "real world." This standard would also
be in line with the reasoning of the federal courts in the line of preHazelwood college press cases that held that the First Amendment
rights of college journalists were no less than those in the community
1 21
at large.
The First Amendment grants professional journalists
substantial protection. The first Supreme Court case dealing with the
"press clause" of the First Amendment, Near v. Minnesota, granted
extensive rights to professional journalists by stressing the
importance of freedom of the press and holding that the government

117. Id. at 534
118. Brown, 308 F.3d at 963-64.
119. Id. at 964.
120. As stated above, California has granted college journalists the same First Amendment
rights as professional journalists via statute. A state may of course, through statute, grant free
speech protections to its citizens above and beyond what is required by the U.S. Constitution.
This Note will consider the appropriateness of granting college journalists expansive rights as a
constitutional matter, not as a statutory matter. Furthermore, California is a historical outlier
with regard to education law. In 1992, the California State Assembly passed a law stating that
students at private universities in the state are subject to the same First Amendment protections
as their public school counterparts. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 2006). Fourteen years later,
no state has passed a comparable statute. Given this history, it seems likely that other states
will not address the question of college journalists' free press rights via statute.
121. See supra Part II.A.
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may not place a prior restraint on a publication. 122 More than thirty
years later, the Supreme Court further protected the rights of the
press when it held in New York Times v. Sullivan that "the
Constitution accords citizens and press an unconditional freedom to
criticize official conduct." 123 In particular, the Court established that
false statements of fact were absolutely protected so long as they were
not made with "actual malice."'124 In another case, New York Times v.
United States, the Court held that newspapers had the right to
publish the "Pentagon Papers," which consisted of classified
government documents, 125 despite the fact that some of the justices
predicted that this publication would be harmful to the United
States.' 26 In coming to its conclusion, the Court reaffirmed that any
prior restraint on publication is presumed to be invalid under the
27
Constitution. 1
Today, the protection of professional journalists from prior
restraint is one of the strongest rights granted to the press under the
First Amendment, but this freedom is not absolute. Although the
press has substantial constitutional freedom, it is limited in other
ways. Professional journalists, though protected from censorship, are
nonetheless subject to criminal and civil laws such as invasion of
privacy and libel. 128 Additionally, newspapers may face internal
pressure from advertisers, news sources, and their own management
to print or not print a particular story.1 29 While the press in the
community at large is subject to several internal and external
constraints, it is nonetheless far more "free" than the press at the high
school or college level.
Therefore, under this standard, college journalists would not be
completely unrestricted. They would be subject to the same level of
liability as commercial publications, but they would not be subject to
prior restraint. Under this standard, any content-based regulation by
a public university of its student newspaper would be a violation of the
First Amendment.

122. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 719 (1931).
123. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 305 (1964).
124. Id. at 279-80. New York Times v. Sullivan defines "actual malice" as "knowledge that
[the statement] was false" or "reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280.
125. N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
126. Id. at 731 (White, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 714.
128. PAUL SIEGEL, COMMUNICATION LAW IN AMERICA 82-83, 159 (2002).

129. Id. at 265-70.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE THREE STANDARDS

A. Hosty's Errorand Why Hosty Is an InappropriateStandard
The crux of Hosty is its assertion that there is "no sharp
difference" between high school and college newspapers. 130 Hosty is
problematic because it blurs the line between these two distinct types
of newspapers and the line between high school and college students,
when the two institutions historically and legally have been viewed as
very different environments. These distinctions undermine Hosty's
central premise-that the high school and college environments are
similar enough to justify giving them the same First Amendment
protections-and call for a different standard to apply to freedom of
speech at the college level. For this reason, even if Hosty does not
spark a "torrent of censorship," as some critics fear, it still lays the
groundwork to treat high schools and universities in the same manner
under the First Amendment. 13 1 Furthermore, whatever Hosty's
persuasive precedential value may be, it is founded on an inaccurate
premise.
1. Hosty Ignores Major Factual Differences Between High School and
Collegiate Newspapers
In coming to the conclusion that there is "no sharp difference"
between high school and college newspapers, the Seventh Circuit
implied that there was no sharp difference between the Innovator, the
paper involved in Hosty, and Spectrum, the newspaper at issue in
Hazelwood.132 In fact, numerous factual distinctions between high
school and college newspapers, as illustrated by the differences
between the Innovator and Spectrum, make this connection, if any, a
tenuous one at best.
The Innovator was an independent publication organized and
published by students and funded by student activity fees. 13 3 The
Innovator was not a part of the university's academic curriculum and
was classified as an extracurricular activity. 34 Although there was a
faculty advisor to the paper, this advisor neither taught a class to the

130. Hosty v. Carter (Hosty 11), 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
131. Lee, supra note 93 (finding that Hosty is unlikely to spark a "torrent of censorship" on
campus).
132. Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 735.
133. Id. at 744 (Evans, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
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students involved with the paper nor controlled the paper's content. 135
Indeed, the university's express policy stated that the staff of the
Innovator would "determine content and format of their respective
publications without censorship or advance approval." 136
By contrast, Spectrum was a publication written and edited by
a high school journalism class that received academic credit for
working for the paper. 137 The class that published the newspaper met
during regular school hours with the teacher who ultimately made the
major decisions regarding the paper. 138 Students submitted their
articles to the teacher, who in turn delivered them to the school's
139
principal for review.
Consequently, the factual differences between the two
newspapers are substantial, and these distinctive features cut to the
heart of the holdings in both Hosty and Hazelwood. Hazelwood's
"legitimate pedagogical concerns" test was tied to the notion that the
newspaper comprised a part of the school's curriculum. The
newspaper's status gave the school a strong interest in regulating it
because the newspaper was part of the teaching and learning process
reached by the "legitimate pedagogical concerns" test.' 40 The
connection between the school's interest and Hazelwood-style
censorship of a publication is much more tenuous in Hosty because the
paper in Hosty was not a part of the curriculum at all. Perhaps more
importantly, the newspapers involved in the Hazelwood and Hosty
decisions are largely representative of newspapers at the high school
and college levels, respectively. In fact, a 1997 study found that of 101
daily college student newspapers, only one was "strongly curriculumbased."1 4 ' For these reasons, Hosty's statement that there is no sharp
difference between high school and college newspapers is erroneous.
Despite a university newspaper's absence from the curriculum,
however, the university still bears some interest in its content. After
all, most college newspapers receive financial support from the
university, support often funded by student fees. This support funds
necessities such as office space and equipment. 142 Additionally,
campus newspapers "are seen as speaking for or representing the

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 268 (1988).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 263.
140. Id. at 271.
141. Mark J. Fiore, Comment, Trampling the "Marketplace of Ideas" The Case Against
Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1962 (2002).
142. O'NEIL, supra note 2, at 125.
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campus community." 143 The titles of many college newspapers include
the name of the university, creating a link between the voices of the
students and those of university administrators. For these reasons, it
is understandable that a university would be concerned with the
content of its publications even if such publications have no connection
with a university's curriculum. Collegiate publications often serve as a
reflection of the university itself, and for this reason a reader may use
his impression of a publication to evaluate the university as a whole.
Such regulatory interests, however, do not justify the court's
rationale in Hosty. Even if one acknowledges an interest by a
university in regulating its student publications, Hosty erred in its "no
sharp difference" language because the "legitimate pedagogical
concerns" at the high school level are very different from those at the
college level. The court failed to recognize this difference.
2. The University's Unique Role as a "Marketplace of Ideas" Sets It
Apart from the High School Environment
Hosty's assertion that there is no fundamental difference
between high school and college newspapers under the First
Amendment runs afoul of the historical character of the university as
a unique marketplace of ideas distinct from the high school
environment. Due to this role, which both courts and educators have
articulated, it would be inappropriate to blur the legal line between
the two institutions.
The notion of the marketplace of ideas dates back to the
earliest First Amendment jurisprudence. In his dissenting opinion in
Abrams v. United States, Justice Holmes noted that "the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market ... [t]hat at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution."' 144 The need for a viable marketplace of ideas is the
underlying principle of most First Amendment protections, both
within the university and the greater community.
Courts have consistently recognized the special role of the
university as a marketplace of ideas deserving special constitutional
protection. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents for the University of the
State of New York, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that

143. Id.
144. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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robust exchange of ideas." 145 In another case, Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, the Court stated that "[t]o impose any strait jacket upon
the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil
the future of our Nation .... Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire; to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity
and understanding, otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
146
die."
In contrast, this "marketplace of ideas" approach has not been
accepted at the elementary or secondary school level. In fact, because
of the age of the students involved, scholars have remarked:
Part of the educator's function is to give students a sense of both the range and limits of
ongoing public debate: students must be shown that there exists a middle ground
between blind adherence to a monolithic orthodoxy and the nihilistic belief that no idea
is better than any other. 147

Similarly, in Ambach v. Norwick, the Supreme Court noted
that "[tihe importance of public schools in the preparation of
individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the
values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our
decisions." 148 The Court has also held that the nation's public schools
have a special mission: the "custodial and tutelary responsibility for
children." 149 This view of a secondary school's purpose is in sharp
contrast to the Court's view of the university in Keyishian.
The contrasting concepts of the missions of colleges and
universities undercut the notion that they may be treated the same
under the First Amendment. If a marketplace of ideas is to function
properly, First Amendment protections must be extremely strong. 150
Perhaps nowhere is the protection of the marketplace more important
than for student newspapers, as these publications are college
students' primary source for information regarding current events on

145. Keyishian v. Board of Regents for the University of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967).
146. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
147. Malcolm Stewart, The First Amendment, the Public Schools, and the Inculcation of
Community Values, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 23, 26-27 (1989).
148. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979).
149. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829-30 (2002).
150. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of
our Constitution.... I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
that an immediate check is required to save the country.").
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their campuses. 15 1 Should a college newspaper be subject to prior
restraint, as in Hosty, its contribution to the marketplace of ideas
could be severely limited, as administrators will have the authority to
censor viewpoints with which they do not agree.
The notion that American colleges and universities have a
mission to serve as marketplaces of ideas alone undercuts the Hosty
reasoning, as Hazelwood-and by extension Hosty-instead gives
educators the power to set pedagogical objectives and restrict speech
that violates those ends. When the "marketplace" notion is contrasted
with the objective of secondary schools, it becomes clear that the
application of Hazelwood to colleges and universities is based on
flawed logic. If Hosty were to become the standard for treatment of
publications at the university level, one of the fundamental missions
of the American university will be greatly inhibited.
3. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Establishes a Strong Contrast
Between High School and College Environments
Another major flaw in the Hosty court's assertion that the
college and high school environments can be construed as essentially
the same is the substantial body of law regarding the Establishment
Clause that draws a different conclusion. A major factor in creating
the Hazelwood test, the standard utilized in Hosty, was the notion
that high school students' lack of maturity gave the school authority to
restrict students' First Amendment rights. Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, however, suggests that a parallel assumption is invalid
at the university level, as these cases draw a sharp distinction
between college and high school.
The nature of the college environment has led courts to be less
fearful of establishment of religion on college campuses than of similar
activities at the secondary school level. For example, in upholding the
Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, which granted federal aid to
church-related colleges, the Supreme Court noted in Tilton v.
Richardson that "college students are less impressionable and less
susceptible to religious indoctrination."'' 52 The Sixth Circuit drew this
indoctrination distinction more sharply in Chaudhuri v. Tennessee,
stating that there is "subtle coercive pressure" to conform to statedirected programs at the elementary and secondary levels that is
"simply not present" at the university level. 153 In permitting the
practice of prayer at a university commencement, the Seventh Circuit
151. ONEIL, supra note 2, at 126.
152. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971).
153. Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 238-39 (6th Cir. 1997).
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similarly noted that those present at the event were "mature" and
therefore were less susceptible to indoctrination. 15 4 Thus, the general
consensus among the courts is that college students' relative maturity
allows for less restrictive Establishment Clause protection at the
university level.
By contrast, courts have been much more concerned with the
establishment of religion at the elementary or secondary school level.
Lee v. Weisman, a leading case on the subject of establishment of
religion at secondary schools, involved a middle school graduation
ceremony in which members of the clergy were invited to give
invocations and benedictions. 155 The Supreme Court held this practice
unconstitutional as a violation of the Establishment Clause. 5 6 In its
holding, the Court noted research that "supports the common
assumption that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from
their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in
matters of social convention."'1 57
At first glance, it may seem unclear how this line of
Establishment Clause caselaw bears on the issue of freedom of the
press. What is key about Establishment Clause litigation is the
importance placed on the age and maturity of the students involved.
Repeatedly, courts have decided that the same approaches cannot be
applied to both high school and college students as a result of this
maturity gap. Comparing Hosty with Establishment Clause
jurisprudence exposes an inconsistency in the classification of college
and high school students under the First Amendment.
The controversy that led to Hazelwood-the removal of certain
articles from the Hazelwood East High School newspaper-arose out
of the principal's belief that those articles were inappropriate for the
school's younger students. 158 The Supreme Court agreed, noting that
educators must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of
students and that the school had a duty to awaken children to cultural
values.1 59 The "legitimate pedagogical concerns" test took into account
the special role schools play in the development of minors and the
need to give secondary schools leeway to fulfill this mission.
Admittedly, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged this distinction in
Hosty when it stated that the difference between high school and
college newspapers may be important when the issue relates to
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985 (7th Cir. 1997).
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992).
Id. at 599.
Id. at 593.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988).
Id. at 272.
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students' maturity.160 This line of Establishment Clause cases,
however, underscores the point that courts have classified-and
should continue to classify-high school and college students
differently under the First Amendment. Therefore, Hosty's statement
that there is "no sharp difference" is highly dubious as a justification
for limiting the rights of college students. If Establishment Clause
precedent is correct in asserting that college students' maturity sets
them apart from their high school counterparts, it would necessarily
mean that Hazelwood's standard would be inapplicable at the
university level.
The major weakness of Hosty, therefore, is the assertion that
college and high school are essentially the same and that a student's
maturity should not be given consideration under most circumstances.
Creating such inconsistency within the ambit of the First Amendment
will lead to further confusion for the courts as to where college
students stand in the realm of freedom of speech.
B. The Flaws of Intermediate Scrutiny
As stated above, the intermediate scrutiny standard as applied
to the First Amendment would allow a university to control the
content of a student publication if it could demonstrate that the
regulation was substantially related to an important state interest
and that the regulation served such an interest. In proposing the
intermediate scrutiny test as an alternative to Hazelwood, the dissent
in Brown noted that such a test would cast a better balance between
students' and educators' interests than the traditional forum analysis
models. 16 1 However, this standard is flawed because it is murky, likely
to confuse student journalists, and prone to abuse by university
administrators.
One major flaw in the intermediate scrutiny test is that it
allows a university to prevail if it provides a compelling governmental
interest for its actions.1 62 Such a standard will breed confusion for
student journalists, college administrators, and the courts. A system
that hinges free speech rights on something as vague as a "compelling
governmental interest" could lead to inconsistent application and
greater censorship down the road because a public educational
institution, as an arm of the government, will naturally want to serve
160. Hosty v. Carter (Hosty H), 412 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
161. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 964 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
162. Id. (discussing that the state has the burden of showing a legitimate pedagogical
purpose).
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its own interests and frame what it believes are "compelling" interests
accordingly.
Furthermore, such a test is not as stringent as it might appear
on its face and therefore is subject to the whim of the courts. A
university seeking to censor a student publication under this test
must demonstrate a connection between this interest and its actions.
The first prong of such analysis, the identification of a compelling
interest, has historically been an easy one for the governmental unit
to satisfy.1 6 3 Courts have also set a low bar for the connection between
a compelling governmental interest and a challenged regulation,
holding that such a regulation satisfies the compelling interest test if
the interest is more likely to be achieved with the regulation than
without it. 164
Justice Kennedy has warned of the danger of applying the
compelling governmental interest standard to speech issues in several
of his First Amendment opinions, stating that the compelling
governmental interest test has "no real or legitimate place" in First
Amendment jurisprudence.1 65 Applying a test containing a "compelling
governmental interest" component to college newspapers is dangerous
to apply to any free speech issue because "resort[ing] to the test might
be read as a concession that States may censor speech whenever they
believe there is a compelling justification for doing so."166 However,
such a standard would be especially troublesome in an educational
environment, where there is already a power imbalance between the
state and the students. Even though most college students are legal
adults, the nature of the college environment often subjects them to
the control of administrators.
Because the intermediate scrutiny standard would allow public
university administrators, as officials of the state, to assert the state's
substantial interest, such interests would be prone to modification and
inconsistent application, creating confusion for student journalists as
to their rights. Such confusion will lead to self-censorship by student

163. Kevin Francis O'Neill, Disentanglingthe Law of Public Protest, 45 LOY. L. REV. 411, 438
(1999).
164. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297 (1994) (stating that "[i]f
the Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the National Parks are adequately
protected, which we think it has, and if the parks would be more exposed to harm without the
sleeping prohibition than with it, the ban is safe from invalidation under the First
Amendment.").
165. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (questioning the Court's past statements that a state may regulate
speech in the pursuit of a compelling interest).
166. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124-125 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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journalists attempting to prevent controversy or avoid disciplinary
action. This standard would further muddy what is already an
exceptionally confusing situation in the federal courts.
C. A Return to Full ProtectionSeems Ideal, but Lacks a Proper
Foundation
On the surface, granting full First Amendment protection to
college journalists seems like the correct answer to courts' dilemma
regarding college students' free press rights. College newspapers seem
much more similar to professional newspapers than to high school
newspapers, and courts have routinely held that college campuses
enjoy strong First Amendment protection. However, applying the legal
standard for professional journalists to college publications (via either
common law or statute) reaches the right result-heightened First
Amendment protection for college newspapers-for the wrong reason
and is therefore an inappropriate standard to apply.
1. A Blanket Grant of Full First Amendment Protection to College
Newspapers is Inappropriate
If Hosty is focused on aligning college students' rights with a
more defined set of rights that is factually similar, on the surface, it
makes much more sense to link college journalists' rights to those of
professional journalists rather than to those of high school
journalists. 1 7 It is true that there are many factual similarities
between college newspapers and commercial newspapers, but there
are not enough to govern the two types of publications under the same
legal standard.
The vast majority of college newspapers exist completely
separate from the university's academic curriculum. Instead, these
publications are typically classified as extracurricular activities and
are supported by student activity fees. It is clear that many student
journalists think of themselves as professionals and attempt to carry
themselves as such in the course of their work. In reaction to the June
2005 Hosty decision, for instance, the editor-in-chief of Eastern Illinois
University's The Daily Eastern News, stated, "[A]s a student
journalist, you need to conduct yourself in a manner that is as much
like a professional journalist as you can." 168
167 Hosty held that there is "no sharp difference" between high school and college
newspapers. See supra Part IV.A.1.
168. Mike Hart, Student Journalists, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER, June 28, 2005,
http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=1045.
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However, there is one major factual difference between a
college newspaper and a commercial newspaper such as the New York
Times: commercial newspapers are financially independent, while
state governments, through public universities, lend their name and
financial resources to their students' publications. This fact should
allow greater government regulation of a public university newspaper
than a commercial newspaper. Although "state financial support alone
is not enough to prevent application of the [F]irst [A]mendment to
student newspapers," 169 courts have held that when a university pays
for forums for student expression such as student publications and
extracurricular activities, it maintains some regulatory interest even
though the activity in question receives strong First Amendment
protection. For example, the Supreme Court held in Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia that when a university
creates or supports a forum for student expression, it maintains
regulatory interests, such as making sure the forum meets the
purpose for which it was created. 170
For these reasons, college newspapers may be distinguished
from commercial publications and thus subject to a different legal
standard. A non-independent student newspaper at a college or
university is not similar enough to a commercial publication that it
can enjoy the same legal rights as those publications. A more
appropriate comparison at the college level can be drawn between an
independent, or "underground," newspaper and a commercial
newspaper; both, as independent publications, enjoy full First
Amendment protection. A university-affiliated newspaper, on the
other hand, requires a different standard.
2. The Underlying Precedent Supporting a Grant of Full Protection
Relies on Invalid Assumptions
The First Amendment's application to students at public
universities has become extremely unclear due to varying
interpretations by the federal appellate courts. Action of some sort by
the Supreme Court is necessary to ensure that university students are
aware of their rights, and therefore that university administrators
cannot have a safety net of qualified immunity if they violate students'
First Amendment rights. Granting full First Amendment protection to
college journalists appears to be the proper outcome, as this is, on the
surface, consistent with two major holdings of the Court: Healy v.

169. Developments in the Law--: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1130 (1968).
170. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 US 819, 829 (1995).
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James and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia. However, both cases assume that the speech in question
takes place in a public forum or is independent student speech, an
assumption that cannot automatically be made regarding college
newspapers.
Both Healy and Rosenberger held that First Amendment
protections should apply on university campuses to the same extent
that they would in the community at large. 171 Both cases, however,
can be distinguished from the situation of a university newspaper.
Rosenberger presumed that the newspaper involved in that case was a
public forum, a fact that is often true but cannot be assumed in every
case. 172 Had the newspaper not been deemed a public forum by the
court, Rosenberger's reasoning, analysis, and ultimate legacy would
have been very different, even if the Court ended up reaching the
same conclusion in the case at bar.
Rosenberger explicitly stated that the speech at issue was made
in a public forum, and Healy was essentially the same in that the
student speech at issue was independent from the university. Healy
involved an independent student group that was seeking benefits from
the university in the form of official university recognition and
associated privileges.1 73 By withholding these benefits from the group
on the basis of its constitutionally protected message, the university
was imposing an unconstitutional condition on the use of its
resources.1 74 Healy would have applied to the situation at hand in
Hosty if the newspaper had been completely independent from the
university and the university had prevented the paper from accessing
university resources on the basis of its message. In Hosty, however,
the newspaper was already sponsored by the university.
The holdings in Healy and Rosenberger were correct as applied
to independent student speech. For example, in the case of an
independent newspaper or a speech given by a student in the middle
171. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835.
172. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
173. Healy, 408 U.S. at 172-73.
174. Perry v. Sindermann articulates the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as follows:
[E]ven though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech.
For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected
speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.
This would allow the government to 'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.'
Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
(1958)).
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of the campus, the First Amendment should apply with the same force
that it does in the outside world. A university-affiliated student
newspaper, however, is a different situation. The distinction between
situations like Healy and Rosenberger and that in Hosty is significant
because it again illustrates the important difference between
independent student speech and student speech affiliated with or
supported by a university.
Until Hazelwood's emergence onto the legal landscape, the
lower federal courts had held consistently that university
administrators could not interfere with the college press. 175 By
asserting that the same law should not apply to college newspapers
and commercial newspapers in the same way, this Note does not argue
that the courts reached the wrong conclusion in these cases. Rather,
the New York Times standard should not apply because of the unique
relationship between a university and its student publications, a
relationship that has no counterpart outside of an educational
environment. College journalists should have a right to broad First
Amendment protection, but the New York Times line of cases is not
the proper route to take to get there.
V. A NEW STANDARD: GRANTING BROAD FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION WHILE RECOGNIZING THE NEEDS OF AN EDUCATIONAL
SETTING

The Supreme Court should articulate a clear, universally
applicable standard with regard to college publications. Hazelwood
and Hosty may provide guidance in articulating such a standard. The
following proposed standard of review combines elements of Hosty,
Hazelwood, and Kincaid, creating a new two-prong test that, when
applied, will increase the free speech rights of college journalists while
allowing universities to retain some control under appropriate
circumstances.

175. See, e.g., Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) (citing Healy for the
proposition that "a college... "may not restrict speech.., simply because it finds the views
expressed by any group to be abhorrent.' "); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (D. Colo.
1971) (finding that " '[i]n the context of an educational institution, a prohibition on protected
speech, to be valid, must be necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with
schoolwork or discipline.' "); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass 1970)
(applying the Tinker interference test to a college newspaper and finding that the school was not
justified in taking action).
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A. Prong One: The Designated Public Forum Presumption
When evaluating the First Amendment status of a university
newspaper under the proposed test, a court should first ask whether
the newspaper is a designated public forum. Both Kincaid and the
dicta in Hosty discuss the implications of the designated public
forum, 176 and forum analysis has long been an important element of
First Amendment application.
In creating a student publication or other student organization,
a university may create a designated public forum if it declares ex
ante the forum open to speech and therefore free from censorship ex
post, should the university decide that a particular type of speech is
unwelcome. 177 In a designated public forum, a university "may declare
the pages of the student newspaper open for expression and thus
disable itself from engaging in viewpoint or content discrimination
17
while the terms on which the forum operates remain unaltered."'
Generally, the test for whether a forum is a designated public
forum is the intent of the government in creating it.179 In the wake of
Hosty, the Student Press Law Center called upon all public
universities in the Seventh Circuit to adopt formal statements
designating their student newspapers as public fora,18 0 but to date
only four universities have done so. 18 1 The others have remained
silent, therefore leaving the door open for pro-censorship
interpretation by university administrators and courts.
Because the university is regarded as a marketplace of ideas
open to student expression, courts should presume that student-run,
university-affiliated publications are designated public fora. Should a
university desire to regulate its student publications, it should bear
the burden of proving that the publication is not a designated public
forum. A university could satisfy this burden by demonstrating a
formal affiliation between the publication and an academic

176. Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I1), 412 F.3d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Kincaid v.
Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 348-49 (6th Cir. 2001).
177. Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 737.
178. Id.; see also Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 354-56 (holding that university administrators' actions
were not permissible given the yearbook's designated public forum status).
179. Id.
180. Student Press Law Center, supra note 84 (detailing 7th Circuit universities that
designated campus papers as public fora).
181. Id. Additionally, some universities outside of the Seventh Circuit, such as the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, have adopted formal public forum statements
regarding their student publications in the wake of Hosty. Kim Peterson, University Head
Affirms Students' Free Press Rights, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER, Sept. 30, 2005,
http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=1085& (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).

2006]

FREEDOM OF THE COLLEGE PRESS

1805

department or by showing a history of administrative or faculty
review of the publication. Along these same lines, a university could
change a publication's status from a designated public forum to a nonpublic forum by creating these conditions.18 2 However, a university
would likely face several challenges from its students, faculty, alumni,
and other interested parties if it attempted to transform its
83
publications to non-public fora.1
Therefore, under the first prong of this test, the question is
whether the university may rebut the presumption that the
publication at issue is a designated public forum. If the university
cannot meet this burden, "the power granted to college and university
officials in Hosty has no force" and the publication will thus "not be
subject to censorship."' 1 4 Instead, the publication will receive the
protections granted to a designated public forum. If the university
meets this burden and the publication is not a designated public
forum, then analysis must continue under the second prong of this
proposed test.
B. Prong Two: The New Pedagogical Concerns Test
Should a university successfully rebut the presumption that a
student newspaper is a designated public forum, then such a
newspaper would be categorized as a non-public forum. In a nonpublic forum, speech is subject to all reasonable regulations of the
government.' 8 5 In order to articulate this standard in the context of
student newspapers, one must determine what interest a university
has in its student publications. Perhaps surprisingly, Hazelwood
provides some guidance in this area.
As stated above, universities maintain an interest in
extracurricular student publications even if a particular publication is
not a part of a university's curriculum. University resources are
allocated to such publications, and these publications often bear the
university's name and brand. Additionally, some authors have arguedthat universities have an educational interest in student
extracurricular activities because recognition of student groups
"reflects the view that a full range and variety of student groups and
activities may contribute almost as much to the student's total
educational experience as academic curriculum." 18 6 In creating and
182.
183.
184.
185

Recent Case, Hosty v. Carter, 119 HARV. L. REV. 915, 919-21 (2006).
Id. at 920-22.
Id. at 918-19.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (emphasis added).

186. O'NEIL, supra note 2, at 110.
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supporting student groups and publications, a university acts in a
manner consistent with its role as a marketplace of ideas.
For this reason, when a student newspaper at the university
level is found to be a nonpublic forum, courts should ask if the
university's regulation is related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
This test seems, at first blush, to be a straightforward application of
Hazelwood to the college setting. In fact it is not, and Hazelwood's
applicability ends here. The question remains the same, but the
answer is very different. This test is not a strict application of
Hazelwood because a university has sharply different pedagogical
concerns from those of a high school. Hosty cited one example of these
differing pedagogical concerns when it stated that a consideration of
students' maturity is not applicable at the university level. Hosty
erred, however, in implying that this should be the only difference
between the tests applied to high schools and colleges.
Because the "legitimate pedagogical concerns" of a university
are very different from those of a high school, the proper application of
this test at the university level will result in broad freedoms to college
journalists. As stated above, the university has a unique role as a
marketplace of ideas, a role that the high school does not share.
Rosenberger in particular articulated the special role of the university:
The first danger to liberty lies in granting the State the power to examine publications
to determine whether or not they are based on some ultimate idea and, if so, for the
State to classify them. The second, and corollary, danger is to speech from the chilling of
individual thought and expression. That danger is especially real in the University
setting, where the State acts against a background and tradition of thought and
experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition ....
The
quality and creative power of student intellectual life to this day remains a vital
measure of a school's influence and attainment. For the University, by regulation, to cast
disapproval on particularviewpoints of its students risks the suppressionof free speech
of the vital centers for the Nation's intellectuallife, its college
and creative inquiry in one
187
and university campuses.

Contrast this vision of the American university with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the mission of public elementary
and secondary schools:
The role and purpose of the American public school system were well described by two
historians, who stated: "[P]ublic education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the
Republic.... It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in
themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of selfgovernment in the community and the nation."... These fundamental values of "habits
and manners of civility" essential to a democratic society must, of course, include
tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed may
be unpopular. But these "fundamental values" must also take into account consideration

187. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow
students. The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing
interest in
18 8
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.

Therefore, because one of the pedagogical purposes of the
university, unlike the secondary school, is to facilitate the marketplace
of ideas, there is no place for regulation of a university newspaper
unless the regulation is viewpoint-neutral.
The next inquiry concerns which viewpoint-neutral regulations
are in line with a university's pedagogical purpose. Kincaid provides
some guidance, even though the court ultimately held that the
publication in question was a designated public forum. In analyzing
the situation in Kincaid, the court noted that a university could place
"minimum standards of competence" on its publications. Kincaid set
the competence bar very low; for instance, one Kincaid judge opined
that a yearbook that was 98 percent blank or consisted of a sack of
condoms would not meet minimum standards of competence, implying
that it would be nearly impossible for a university to argue that a
publication did not meet the minimum competency standard. 189
As for other content-neutral regulations, a university may have
a regulatory interest in student speech that constitutes plagiarism or
otherwise violates a university's honor code. Additionally, if a
university can demonstrate an interest in training responsible
journalists, it might, in contrast with the New York Times v. Sullivan
standard for professional journalists, be able to regulate negligentlymade false statements of fact. Such a regulation would only be
permissible in accordance with this test if the newspaper was not a
public forum and was instead aligned with a journalism curriculum. A
university cannot claim to have a legitimate pedagogical commitment
to training journalists if it does not in fact train them. Furthermore, a
university that only regulates those negligent statements of fact
connected to particular viewpoints is engaging in impermissible
viewpoint regulation.
Of course, this prong shares the same disadvantage as every
other First Amendment test: it is prone to exploitation by clever and
opportunistic governmental officials. Therefore, in applying this test,
courts must keep a sharp eye on the motives of the university and not
permit viewpoint-based regulations masked as viewpoint-neutral
pedagogical objectives to stand.
188. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 US 675, 681 (1986) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
189. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 358 (6th Cir. 2001) (Boggs, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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C. Application of the New Test to Hosty v. Carter
As stated above, the Seventh Circuit's holding in Hosty
revolved around qualified immunity. However, removing the qualified
immunity element of Hosty and applying the proposed test to the facts
of the case illustrates the test's effectiveness and its protectiveness of
student speech as expressed via a college newspaper. Under the
proposed test, the Hosty plaintiffs almost certainly would have
prevailed under the first prong: the public forum presumption. The
facts, namely that the university's Student Communications Media
Board had a policy of non-censorship, strongly suggest that the
Innovator was a designated public forum. As a result of these facts, it
would be nearly impossible for administrators to rebut the
presumption that the Innovator is a designated public forum.
Even if (hypothetically) the Hosty facts did not satisfy the first
prong of the proposed test, the protections granted by the second
prong would have required a decision in favor of the student plaintiffs.
In this case, Dean Carter tried to force the paper to submit to prior
review after it printed articles and editorials critical of university
administration. In doing so, defendant Carter argued that the paper
made false statements of fact, which, if the allegations were true,
could allow the university to regulate the speech at issue. Given the
circumstances of the case, however, it seems likely that the
administration's attempted regulations were not viewpoint-neutral, as
university officials had only expressed interest in regulating the paper
after the newspaper printed articles critical of administrators.
Furthermore, even the alleged falsity of the statements made in the
Innovator would not allow the university to place a prior restraint on
all subsequent issues of the paper. Hosty is a prime example of a
viewpoint regulation masked as a neutral one.
The application of the proposed test to the facts of Hosty
demonstrates its commitment to students' First Amendment freedoms
and how the Seventh Circuit erred: had it applied Hazelwood properly,
it would have reached the opposite result. Despite scholars' concerns
about the application of Hazelwood at the college level, applying a
pedagogical concerns test that accounts for the differences between
colleges and universities would in fact enhance and clarify the First
Amendment freedoms of college students.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Had the Supreme Court granted certiorari, Hosty v. Carter
would have been the stage for a debate eighteen years in the making.
Ever since Hazelwood declined to address the First Amendment status
of college publications, free press advocates have waited with bated
breath for the issue to be resolved once and for all. Their wait will
continue until the Supreme Court grants review to a similar case. At
some point, the Court must determine the rights of college journalists.
For far too long, student publications at public colleges and
universities have been in legal limbo under the First Amendment, and
those few courts that have faced the issue have been able to use
qualified immunity to dodge the real problem at hand.
For the reasons outlined above, Hosty fully extended
Hazelwood to university newspapers based on flawed logic, logic which
could have a drastic effect on students' free press rights. Given the
widespread confusion over the application of the First Amendment to
college campuses, intermediate standards of review, though more
protective of students' rights than the pure application of Hazelwood
at the college level, would only make a bad legal situation worse.
The two-prong test outlined in this Note thus provides the best
possible balance among students' First Amendment rights,
universities' regulatory interests, and courts' prior holdings. By
presuming that student-run publications at public universities are
designated public fora, courts would protect students from
opportunistic administrators and would also have an easier time
interpreting the facts of individual cases. As for those publications
that are non-public fora, applying the Hazelwood inquiry of whether
the university has a legitimate pedagogical concern, but not
Hazelwood's narrow answer, would allow courts to take into account
the unique nature of the collegiate environment and protect student
speech accordingly. High schools and colleges are different
communities, each with its own set of pedagogical concerns. In
articulating this difference, the only correct holding is that viewpointbased regulation of college newspapers is a violation of the First
Amendment.
In the eighteen years since the Supreme Court decided
Hazelwood, the question of college newspapers' First Amendment
status has perplexed the federal courts. For nearly two decades, free
press advocates have feared Hazelwood's application to college media,
presuming that such an application would lead to widespread
censorship. By declining to hear Hosty, the Supreme Court extended
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this controversy and forced student journalists, especially those in the
Seventh Circuit, to face an uncertain future. The time for college
journalists to receive these First Amendment freedoms is long
overdue.
Jessica B. Lyons*
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